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Abstract
The aim of behaviour change is to help people to change aspects of their behaviour for the
better (e.g., to decrease calorie intake, to drink in moderation, to take more exercise, to complete a
course of antibiotics once started, etc.). In current persuasion technology for behaviour change, the
emphasis is on helping people to explore their issues (e.g., through questionnaires or game playing)
or to remember to follow a behaviour change plan (e.g., diaries and email reminders). However,
recent developments in computational persuasion are leading to an argument-centric approach to
persuasion that can potentially be harnessed in behaviour change applications. In this paper, we
review developments in computational persuasion, and then focus on domain modelling as a key
component. We present a multi-dimensional approach to domain modelling. At the core of this
proposal is an ontology which provides a representation of key factors, in particular kinds of belief,
which we have identified in the behaviour change literature as being important in diverse behaviour
change initiatives. Our proposal for domain modelling is intended to facilitate the acquisition and
representation of the arguments that can be used in persuasion dialogues, together with meta-level
information about them which can be used by the persuader to make strategic choices of argument
to present.
Keywords: Computational argumentation; Computational models of argument; Dialogue
systems; Persuasion; Behaviour change; Knowledge engineering
Declarations of interest: None
1 Introduction
Persuasion is an activity that involves one party trying to induce another party to believe something or
to do something. It is an important and multifaceted human facility. Obviously, sales and marketing
is heavily dependent on persuasion. But many other activities involve persuasion such as a doctor
persuading a patient to drink less alcohol, a road safety expert persuading drivers to not text while
driving, or an online safety expert persuading users of social media sites to not reveal too much personal
information online.
The aim of persuasion is for the persuader to change the mind of the persuadee. Some kinds of
interaction surrounding persuasion include: the persuader collecting information, preferences, etc., from
the persuadee; the persuader providing information, offers, etc., to the persuadee; and the persuader win-
ning favour (e.g., by flattering the persuadee, by making small talk, by being humorous, etc.). However,
arguments (and counterarguments) are the essential structures for presenting the claims (and counter-
claims) in persuasion. An argument-centric focus on persuasion leads to a number of aspects that can be
∗Corresponding author (anthony.hunter@ucl.ac.uk)
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important in bringing about successful persuasion such as the rationality of the argumentation, appro-
priateness of the persuader, the appropriateness of the language used in the arguments, the psychological
strategies used by the persuader, and the personality of the persuadee.
As computing becomes involved in every sphere of life, so too is persuasion a target for applying
computer-based solutions. Persuasion technologies have come out of developments in human-computer
interaction research (see, for example, the influential work by Fogg [Fog98]) with a particular emphasis
on addressing the need for systems to help people make positive changes to their behaviour, particularly
in healthcare and lifestyle choices. In recent years, a wide variety of systems has been developed to
help users to control body weight [LO10], to reduce fizzy drink consumption [LO12], to increase physical
exercise [ZSM+12], to decrease stress-related illness [KMKK10], to reduce speeding [MGW+16], and to
increase health-conscious food shopping [SSC+17].
Many of these persuasion technologies for behaviour change are based on some combination of ques-
tionnaires for finding out information from users, provision of information for directing the users to
better behaviour, computer games to enable users to explore different scenarios concerning their be-
haviour, provision of diaries for getting users to record ongoing behaviour, and messages to remind the
user to continue with the better behaviour. These systems tend to be heavily scripted multi-media
solutions and they are often packaged as websites and/or apps for mobile devices.
Interestingly, explicit use of argumentation is not central to most current manifestations of persua-
sion technologies. Either arguments are provided implicitly in the persuasion technology (e.g., through
provision of information, or through game playing), or it is assumed that the user has considered the
arguments for changing behaviour prior to accessing the persuasion technology (e.g., when using diaries,
or receiving email reminders). Explicit argumentation with consideration of arguments and counter-
arguments is not supported with existing persuasion technologies. Yet, for some tasks in behaviour
change, an argument-based approach could be highly beneficial, particularly when someone is lacking
some key information, and/or entertaining misconceptions about a topic. Via the use of argument-based
technology, personalized context-sensitive information can be provided to fill in those gaps and those
misconceptions in a user’s information. Overall, the system may be able to change the user’s mind about
belief in some key arguments, and potentially, as a result, persuade the user to believe and follow up the
persuasion goal.
This creates some interesting opportunities for artificial intelligence, using computational models
of argument, to develop persuasion technologies for behaviour change where arguments are central.
For reviews of computational models of argumentation, a.k.a computational argumentation, see [BD07,
BH08, RS09]. This leads to an opportunity for what we call computational persuasion, or equivalently,
an argument-centric persuasion for behaviour change. Computational models of argument are beginning
to offer ways to formalize aspects of persuasion, and with some adaptation and development, they have
the potential to be incorporated into valuable tools for behaviour change.
There are numerous potential applications of computational persuasion that could be used to encour-
age and guide people to change behaviour in healthcare including:
• Healthy life-styles (e.g., eating fewer calories, eating more fruit and veg, doing more exercise,
drinking less alcohol).
• Treatment compliance (e.g., undertaking self-management of diabetes, completing a course of
antibiotics, completing a course of prophylactics).
• Treatment reduction (e.g., using alternatives to painkillers for premenstrual syndrome, not
requesting antibiotics for viral infections)
• Problem avoidance (e.g., taking vaccines, taking malaria prophylactics, using safe sex practices).
• Screening (e.g., participating in breast cancer screening, participating in cervical smear screening,
self-screening for prostate cancer, breast cancer, bowel cancer, and melanoma)
In an argument-centric approach to persuasion in behaviour change, a software system (the persuader)
enters into a dialogue with a user (the persuadee). In the dialogue, arguments and counterarguments can
be considered. The system undertakes this dialogue with the aim of providing the right combinations
of arguments to persuade the user to accept a specific argument (the persuasion goal) that encapsulates
the reason for a change of behaviour in some specific respect. For example, the persuasion goal might
be that the user needs to eat fruit in order to be more healthy, and the system presents supporting
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arguments (based on evidence, expert opinion, explanation of the fit with the user’s goals, etc.) and
counter-arguments that to correct misconceptions or inconsistencies in the user’s goals and opinions.
A key contribution of computational models of argument is a range of formalisms for describing
arguments, and relationships between them such as attack (e.g., argument A attacks argument B when
A has a claim that negates some of the premises of B) and support (e.g., argument A supports argument
B when the claim of A implies some of the premises of B). For applying an argument-centric approach
to persuasion in behaviour change, we also require methods for acquiring and arranging those arguments
for a specific domain. Unfortunately, computational models of argument do not provide these kinds of
methods, and therefore there is a need to develop methods for domain modelling that will allow us to
develop and apply domain models in computational persuasion.
In this paper, our aim is to focus on the role of domain modelling in computational persuasion. We
explain how domain modelling is important for an application, we provide a framework for domain mod-
elling based on a multi-dimensional framework for classifying arguments that facilitates the construction
of domain models, and we explain how the domain modelling (i.e., the classifications of arguments) can
be harnessed to enable good choices of move in a dialogue.
We proceed as follows: (Section 2) We provide some background to behaviour change theory and
identify some key types of factor used in behavioural change models; (Section 3) We review computa-
tional persuasion for behaviour change; (Section 4) We present a framework for domain modelling that
incorporates an ontology based on factors identified in Section 2; (Section 5) We present five cases studies
that are based on the framework presented in Section 4; (Section 6) We consider how a domain model
developed according to the framework presented in Section 4 can be used by the persuader; (Section 7)
We discuss the contributions in the paper, and consider future work.
2 Behaviour change theory
Behaviour change theory offers a wide range of models that provide connections between the characteris-
tics of a persuadee, and the context of the problem, and the outcomes of the behaviour change initiative
(e.g., whether the persuadee is persuaded, whether the persuadee actually changes behaviour, etc.). Dif-
ferent models focus on different aspects of a persuadee and of the context. In general, these models aim
to identify characteristics that will have a positive or negative influence on a desired outcome.
These models are often supported by evidence that show for specific behaviour change initiatives, the
degree to which the behaviour change initiative was successful. The models can then be applied to new
behaviour change initiatives with some indication of the degree to which it might be effective.
Two important models for behaviour change, which we illustrated in Figure 1, are protection mo-
tivation theory [Rog75] and the theory of planned behaviour [AM86]. For the protection motivation
theory, there are five parameters that influence whether or not someone has the intention to change
behaviour, and whether or not she does change behaviour. For theory of planned behaviour, there are
also some intermediate parameters which influence the intention to change behaviour, and one of which
also influences whether or not she does change behaviour. For a review of models of behaviour change,
see [MWC+14].
We do not adhere to any specific behaviour change model in this paper. Rather, we would like to
identify some interesting dimensions of them that we can harness in our approach to domain modelling.
We start with how the system (persuader) or user (persuadee) would like the world to be.
• Goals of the agent that are related to the healthcare problem: Whether an agent has
short or long term goals that impact on the problem or are impacted by the problem (see, for
instance, the goals parameter of self-determination theory [DR12]). For example, an agent may
have a short-term goal to get fit in order to run a marathon, or a long-term goal to remain healthy
in order to see her grandchildren grow up. Note, the goals of a persuader are not necessarily the
same as the persuadee. For example, a persuader might have the goal for the persuadee to eat
more fruit and less chocolate, and the persuadee might have the goal to indulge in comfort foods
such as chocolate.
Now we consider how the world is perceived by either the system or the user. For an agent that could
be subject to a behaviour change initiative, the beliefs of the agent and about the agent are regarded
as of central importance in a number of behaviour change models. By beliefs we mean not only about
beliefs about facts but also beliefs about capability, opportunity, and motivation [MWC+14]. There is
substantial evidence in the behaviour change literature that shows the importance of the beliefs of a
3
Severity (e.g., Bowel can-
cer is a serious illness)
Susceptibility (e.g., my chances
of getting bowel cancer are high)
Response effectiveness
(e.g., changing my diet
would improve my health)
Self-efficacy (e.g., I am confident
that I can change my diet)
Fear (e.g., I am scared
of getting cancer)
Intentions Behaviour
(a) Protection motivation theory.
Belief about outcomes
Belief about others’ attitude
to behaviour (e.g., my friends
will approve if I lose weight)
Motivation to comply with others
(e.g., I want the approval of my
friends about my healthiness)
Internal control
(skills/ability/information)
External control (ob-
stacles/opportunities)
Attitude
towards the
behaviour
Subjective
norms
Behavioural
control
Intentions
Behaviour
(b) Theory of planned behaviour.
Figure 1: Two behaviour change models: Protection motivation theory which is based on using health
beliefs to predict health behaviours [Rog75]; And theory of planned behaviour which also considers habits
and environmental factors also needed for prediction [AM86]. The examples are from [Ogd11].
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persuadee affecting the likelihood that the persuadee will be persuaded by a specific behaviour change
intervention. We draw out some of the kinds of belief that are important in the following listing where
we consider the beliefs with respect to some healthcare problem. Note, these kinds of beliefs are not
meant to be exhaustive nor disjoint.
• Beliefs concerning causes of the healthcare problem: Whether the agent regards the cause
being internal (i.e., herself) or external (see, for instance, the perceived control parameter of the
health belief model [RSB88] or the modelling of locus of control [WW82]). For example, an agent
acknowledges that she is overweight because she drinks too many soft drinks, versus the agent who
blames the food corporations for making the drinks too calorific.
• Beliefs concerning opportunities for resolving the healthcare problem: Whether the
agent is aware of options for addressing the problem (see, for instance, the external control param-
eter in the theory of planned behaviour [AM86]). For example, for an agent who has an alcohol
consumption problem, an option for attempting to resolve the problem is a self-help group for
encouraging drinking in moderation.
• Beliefs concerning obstacles for resolving the healthcare problem: Whether the agent
perceives reasons for being unable to address the problem (see, for instance, the external control
parameter in the theory of planned behaviour [AM86]). For example, for an agent who has an
alcohol consumption problem, an obstacle for attempting to resolve the problem might be that the
agent works in a bar.
• Beliefs concerning capacity for resolving the healthcare problem: Whether the agent
perceives himself as having the capability for resolving the problem (see, for instance, the self-
efficacy parameter in protection motivation theory [Rog75] or the internal control parameter in the
theory of planned behaviour [AM86]). For example, for an agent who has an alcohol consumption
problem, and who is aware of a self-help group for encouraging drinking in moderation, believes
she has the motivation to go to the self-help group regularly, and to follow through with a serious
attempt at drinking in moderation. As another example, an agent might believe that she is unable
to follow a specific diet aimed at reducing calorie intake (i.e., she believes the temptation to deviate
from the diet would be too great). Beliefs concerning the past behaviour of the agent may be an
important part of this: Whether an agent undertakes actions to compound the problem, and/or
whether the agent undertakes actions that resolve the problem. For example, for an agent who has
decided to attend a self-help group for encouraging drinking in moderation, what is her current
rate of alcohol consumption, and how often does she attend the self-help group? Past behaviour
has been used to augment the theory of planned behaviour model to predict young people’s sun
safety in Australia [WRY+08].
• Beliefs concerning risks from the healthcare problem: Whether an agent has a reasonable
or biased perception of her own risk concerning the healthcare problem (see, for instance, the
susceptibility parameter in protection motivation theory [Rog75] or the susceptibility or severity
parameters of the health belief model [RSB88] or the threat parameter of the health action process
approach [Sch08]). For example, an agent might think that drinking a large quantity of alcohol
at the weekend is ok if she does not drink during the week. For another example, an agent might
think she is not at risk from cervical cancer because she is not sexually active.
• Beliefs concerning benefits from resolving the healthcare problem: Whether an agent has
a reasonable or biased perception of her own benefits concerning the healthcare problem (see, for
instance, the belief about outcomes parameter in the theory of planned behaviour [AM86] or the
susceptibility or severity parameters of the health belief model [RSB88]). For example, a smoker
might be unaware that there are short-term health benefits (decreased risk of cardiac arrest) and
long term health benefits (decreased risk of cancer) of ceasing to smoke even if she has been a
smoker for many years.
• Beliefs concerning costs of resolving the healthcare problem: Whether an agent has a
reasonable or biased perception of the cost of undertaking a course of action to resolve the healthcare
problem (see, for instance, the cost parameter of the health belief model [RSB88]). For example,
an unemployed person might believe that she cannot participate in exercise activities at her local
sports centre because she lacks money, and so she might be unaware that often sports centres offer
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reduced cost or free activities for unemployed people. For another example, an agent might believe
that it is cool to smoke, and hence if she stops smoking, this will be a price to pay (i.e., a cost).
• Beliefs concerning the motivation of the agent for resolving the healthcare problem:
Whether an agent has a high or low motivation for addressing a healthcare problem (see, for
instance, the motivation parameters of the health belief model [RSB88] or the motivation parameter
of the information-motivation-behavioural skills model [FFH03]). For example, is an agent just
considering joining a gym because the idea is vaguely appealing, or is she seriously interested in
finding a course of action to improve her fitness? Motivation captures the drive or effort an agent
may put into pursuing a goal, or a addressing a specific commitment. For example, a pair of friends
may make the commitment to join a local fun run. The first agent may be very unfit but goes for a
training run 5 days a week in preparation for the fun run, whereas the second agent may be fitter
than the first agent but does no training. In this case, the first agent is showing more commitment
than the second agent.
• Beliefs concerning the agent’s community and their view of the healthcare problem:
Whether an agent believes that there are others in her community who have views on the agent
and/or on the healthcare problem (see, for instance, the belief’s about others’ attitude to behaviour
or the motivation to comply with others parameters in the theory of planned behaviour [AM86] or
the social influences parameter of the integrated change model [DMVH05]). For example, an agent
might believe that her family thinks she drinks too much, and that they would be happy if she
reduced her consumption to a more healthy level. As another example, an agent might have the
desire to lose weight because she wants to be seen as healthy by her friends.
• Beliefs concerning commitments of the agent that are related to the healthcare prob-
lem: Whether an agent has really committed to address a specific healthcare problem and to a
specific course of action for addressing that problem. A commitment is an action that goes some
way to addressing a specific goal [LWS+13]. For example, an agent may have a goal to get fit,
but the agent then needs to commit to getting fit, and to a specific regime for getting fit such
as going for a 20 minute jog three times a week. As another example, an agent may have a goal
of running a marathon, and part of addressing that goal, she may have paid the fee to enter the
London Marathon (i.e., paying the fee is a commitment). A commitment can also support the case
for new goals. For example, if an agent is not training regularly, and she pays the fee to enter a
marathon, then this commitment supports the goal that she should start to train regularly.
The options we discuss above are some key dimensions that we can harness in computational per-
suasion, and in particular, we use them to help us construct domain models. As we will explain in the
following sections, they provide cues for arguments and counterarguments that we can include in domain
models, and they provide meta-level typing of those arguments and counterarguments.
3 Towards computational persuasion in behaviour change
We now turn to how we can bring an argument-based approach into software for persuasion, thereby
leading to a notion of computational persuasion. We start by defining the notion of an automated
persuasion system, and use this to define the notion of computational persuasion. We then consider our
requirements, in the short-term, and components, for an automated persuasion system in healthcare.
An automated persuasion system (APS) is a system that can engage in a dialogue with a user
(the persuadee) in order to persuade the persuadee to do (or not do) some action or to believe (or not
believe) something [Hun16a]. To do this, an APS aims to use convincing arguments in order to persuade
the persuadee. The dialogue may involve moves including queries, claims, and importantly, arguments
and counterarguments, that are presented according to some protocol that specifies which moves are
permitted or obligatory at each dialogue step. The dialogue may involve stages where the system finds
out more about the persuadee’s beliefs, intentions and desires, and where the system offers arguments
with the aim of changing the persuadee’s beliefs, intentions and desires. The system also needs to handle
objections or doubts (represented by counterarguments) with the aim of convincing the user to accept
the persuasion goal (i.e., the argument that encapsulates the reason for a change of behaviour in some
respect).
The dialogue may be asymmetric since the kinds of moves that the APS can present may be different
to the moves that the persuadee may make. For instance, the persuadee might be restricted to only
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Since you do little ex-
ercise, you should do
a regular exercise class
When I do exercise,
I get very hungry
and I put on weight
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
(a) Asking for argument belief.
How often do you
have face-to-face con-
tact with patients?
Less than once per week
Between 1 and 5 per week
Between 6 and 30 per week
Between 30 and
100 per week
More than 100 per week
(b) Asking for a fact.
Which are goals for you?
Staying healthy
Living a long life
Doing interesting activities
Relaxing
Doing as little as possible
Being with the family
Being healthy
for the family
Looking good
Being fit for my sport
Saving time
(c) Asking for goals.
Figure 2: Interface for an asymmetric dialogue move for asking the user’s belief in an argument. (a) The
top argument is by the APS, and the second argument is a counterargument presented by the APS. The
user uses the menu to give her belief in the counterargument. (b) A query is asked that may be used
in a user model and menu of answers is provided. (c) A query is asked by the system to determine the
goals of the user. Here the user may select number of the items on the list.
making arguments by selecting them from a menu (in order to obviate the need for natural language
processing of arguments being entered). In the extreme, it may be that only the APS can make moves.
In Figure 2a, a dialogue step is illustrated where a user can state the degree of agreement or disagreement
in an argument, and Figure 2b and Figure 2c illustrate dialogue moves that involve queries.
Whether an argument is convincing depends on the context, and on the characteristics of the per-
suadee. An APS maintains a model of the persuadee to predict what arguments and counterarguments
the persuadee knows about and/or believes, and this can be harnessed by the strategy of the APS in
order to choose good moves to make in the dialogue.
Since, we assume that an APS for behaviour change is a software application running on a desktop or
mobile device, this creates some difficult short-term challenges to automate persuasion. We summarize
these challenges as follows.
1. Need for informative asymmetric dialogues without natural language interface.
2. Need for short dialogues to keep the user engaged.
3. Need for well-chosen arguments to maximize impact of the user.
4. Need to model the user beliefs in order to be able to optimize the dialogue.
5. Need to learn from previous interactions with the agent or similar agents.
6. Need to model the domain to generate arguments/counterarguments to present to the user.
In the rest of this section, we discuss how the requirements can be addressed. Some of our proposals
are preliminary as these are challenging research questions.
Computational persuasion is the study of formal models of dialogues involving arguments and
counterarguments, user models, and strategies, for APSs [Hun16a]. As such, computational persua-
sion builds on developments in computational models of argument which is a branch of AI concerned
with formalizing aspects of the human ability to construct, exchange, and evaluate argumentation and
counterarguments.
To illustrate how a dialogue can lead to the presentation of an appropriate context-sensitive argument
consider the example in Table 1. In this, only the APS presents arguments, and when it is the user’s
turn she can only answer questions (e.g., yes/no questions) or select arguments from a menu.
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Step Who Move
1 APS To improve your health, you could join an exercise class
2 User Exercise classes are boring
3 APS There are exciting exercise classes. You can do an indoor climbing course.
4 User It is too expensive
5 APS Do you work?
6 User No
7 APS If you are registered unemployed, then the local sports centre offers
a free indoor climbing course
8 APS Would you try this?
9 User Yes
Table 1: Simple example of an asymmetric dialogue between a user and an APS. As no natural language
processing is assumed, the arguments posted by the user are actually selected by the user from a menu
provided by the APS.
I will sign up for
a sports activity.
I feel too self-conscious
about my body to do sport.
I feel too intimi-
dated to do sport.
Sports clubs seem intim-
idating and unwelcoming.
I do not have the
body for sport.
I do not have the right
clothes to do sport.
I do not know what
I am supposed to do
when I try to do sport.
People who do
sport come in all
shapes and sizes.
Most people who do
sport really do not care
about sports fashion.
Many sports clubs are very keen
to welcome new comers, and
offer beginners classes for them.
Figure 3: An example of a bipolar argument graph (i.e. a graph where each node denotes an argument
and each arc denotes either a support or attack relationship) concerning persuasion to sign up for a
sports activity. A dashed line denotes a support (where the source of the arc is a supporter and the
target of the arc is the supportee) and a solid line denotes an attack (where the source of the arc is an
attacker and the target of the arc is the attackee) .
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In order to provide this behaviour, we assume an APS has the following components that are used
to operate in a persuasion dialogue.
Domain model This contains the arguments that can be presented in the dialogue by the system, and
it also contains the arguments that the user may entertain. The domain model can be represented
by a bipolar argument graph (see, for example, Figure 3). This is a graph where each node is an
argument, and each arc denotes a relationship between pairs of arguments. We consider two types
of relationship for an arc from A to B. The first is an attack relationship, and so the arc from A to B
denotes that A attacks B (i.e., A is a counterargument for B). The second is a support relationship,
and so the arc from A to B denotes that A supports B (i.e., A provides further information that
supports for B).
User model This contains information about the user that can be used by the system for making good
choices of move. The information in the user model is what the system believes is true about the
user. A key dimension that we consider in the user model is the belief that the user may have in the
arguments, and as the dialogue proceeds, the model can be updated [Hun15] based on the results
of the queries and of the arguments posited. Other dimensions of a user model may include some
categorization of the personality of the user, the topics the user may be interested, the viewpoints
the user may hold, the goals of the user, etc.
Protocol A dialogue is a sequence of moves such as asking a query, making a claim, presenting a
premises, conceding to a premise presented by another agent, etc. The protocol specifies the moves
that are allowed or required by each participant at step of a dialogue. There are a number of
proposals for dialogues (e.g., [Pra05, Pra06, FT11, CP12]). For examples of protocols for persuasion
in behaviour change, see [Hun15, Hun16b]. The dialogue may involve steps where the system finds
out more about the user’s beliefs, intentions and desires, and where the system offers arguments
with the aim of changing the user’s beliefs, intentions and desires. Moves can involve arguments
taken from the domain model, and/or they can be queries to improve the domain model.
Strategy model The strategy model uses the user model to select the moves that are allowed by the
protocol. There are a number of roles for arguments. For instance, an argument may be a persuasion
goal (i.e., an argument that the system wants the user to accept), or a user counterargument (i.e.,
an argument that the user regards as a counterargument against an argument by the system), or a
system counterargument (i.e., an argument that the system regards as a counterargument against
an argument by held by the system), or a user supporting argument (i.e., an argument that the
user regards as supporting an argument by held the user), or a system supporting argument (i.e.,
an argument that the system regards as supporting an argument presented by the system). We
can harness decision-theoretic decision rules for optimizing the choice of arguments based on the
user model [HH17]. See [Thi14] for a review of strategies in multi-agent argumentation.
There are some promising developments that could form the basis of APSs for behaviour change.
Furthermore, there have already been some promising studies using dialogue games for health promotion
[Gra98, CGJ99, GCJ00, Gra03], embodied conversational agents for encouraging exercise [NME07], dia-
logue management for persuasion [AMD08], and tailored assistive living systems for encouraging exercise
[GNL16], that indicate the potential for APSs.
Since our primary concern in the paper is in domain modelling, our focus will be on how the domain
model can be structured (Sections 4 and 5). However, we will also touch on how this structure can
influence the design of the user model and how this structure can be harnessed with the user model for
making strategic choices of move in a dialogue (Section 6).
4 Framework for domain modelling
The aim of domain modelling for an APS is to catalogue a range of arguments that can be deployed in a
persuasion dialogue, and to annotate each of those arguments with meta-level information about them.
This meta-level information can help to ensure that the structure of graph is adequate (e.g., arguments
that are based on incorrect, but commonly held beliefs, are attacked by factual arguments), and more
importantly they can be used to make strategic choices of move. For instance, the most appropriate
arguments can be selected according to what is known about the persuadee.
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Cause of
the problem
Risk from
the problem
Benefit from
resolving
the problem
Motivation
for resolving
the problem
Commitment
for resolving
the problem
PROBLEM
Community view
of the problem
and its resolution
Attitude to
considering
the problem
and/or solution
Myth concern-
ing problem
and/or solution
Background
to problem
and/or solution
SOLUTION
Opportunity
for a solution
to the problem
Cost of solution
Obstacle
to applying
the solution
Side-effect
from applying
the solution
Capacity
for applying
the solution
Figure 4: Graphical representation of the ontological types and their relationship to either the healthcare
problem or healthcare solution.
4.1 Ontological types
We start by introducing a number of ontological types. These types provide a breakdown of the kinds
of belief introduced in our review of factors in behaviour change models in Section 2. Our approach is
to have an ontology that identifies whether the ontological type (and therefore an argument that has
this type) concerns the healthcare problem or the healthcare solution or both. Note, the types are not
intended to be exhaustive or disjoint. This means that some arguments may be tagged with multiple
ontological types.
• A cause argument is an argument that gives facts or an opinion about the cause of a healthcare
problem. For example, an agent is having a persistent cough because she smokes. As another
example, an agent is overweight because she drinks too many soft drinks, or an agent is overweight
because the food corporations make soft drinks too calorific.
• An attitude argument is an argument that gives an opinion on the agent’s attitude to considering
the problem and/or solution. For example, my doctor recommends that vaccine, and so I will
take it, or I resent my doctor raising the question of my body weight, and so I refuse to consider
suggestion for losing weight, or I switch off if I am given statistics.
• A risk argument is an argument that describes an event that can happen with some probability
in a time frame with a negative payoff (e.g., smoking can result in lung cancer). Special cases
are the following: A large risk (e.g., overdosing on heroin can cause death); A small risk (e.g.,
the malaria prophylactic chloroquine can cause stomach upsets); A long-term risk (e.g., smoking
can result in lung cancer); A short-term risk (e.g., smoking can cause coughing); A high risk
(e.g., long-term heavy drinking is likely to cause liver damage); A low risk (e.g., side effects from
paracetamol are rare but can include an allergic reaction, which can cause a rash and swelling);
and A threat is a special case where the system (or system owner) can invoke a sanction on the
user (e.g., texting while driving company vehicles will be treated as a serious disciplinary issue,
or smoking on company premises will be treated as a serious disciplinary issue). Risks can be
ranked by the persuader by the perceived negative value to the persuadee. This negative value is
an aggregate of the probability the risk will occur and the seriousness of that occurrence to the
persuadee. For example, consider the risks A and B from sunbathing without suncream where A is
“If I sunbathe without suncream, my skin will become wrinkled", and B is “If I sunbathe without
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suncream, I will get a melanoma". The persuader may think that the persuadee would regard A as
a bigger risk than B, and rank them accordingly. This ranking may then be used by the persuadee
to select A in preference to B in a dialogue with the persuadee.
• A benefit argument describes an event that can happen with some probability in a time frame
with a positive payoff (e.g., stopping smoking can result in better life expectancy). Some benefits
arguments may be uncertain or even incorrect. For example, a long-term smoker might think that
having smoked for so long, there is no healthcare benefit of giving up smoking. As another example,
in trying to persuade a teenager with sensitive skin to use sun protection cream, the teenager might
believe that her current usage of factor 10 cream is sufficient. Special cases of benefits arguments
are short-term benefit, long-term benefit, etc. A reward or incentive is a special case where the
system (or system owner) can invoke a payoff to the user in exchange for accepting a persuasion
goal. Benefits can be ranked by the persuader by the perceived positive value to the persuadee.
This positive value is an aggregate of the probability the benefit will occur and the how good that
occurrence will be to the persuadee. For example, consider the benefits A and B from ceasing to
smoke where A is “If I give up smoking, my skin will look better", and B is “If I give up smoking,
I am less likely to get lung cancer". The persuader may think that the persuadee would regard
A as a bigger benefit than B, and rank them accordingly. This ranking may then be used by the
persuadee to select A in preference to B in a dialogue with the persuadee.
• An opportunity argument is an argument that provides facts or an opinion concerning an op-
portunity for resolving the healthcare problem. For example, for an agent who has an alcohol
consumption problem, an option for attempting to resolve the problem is a self-help group for
encouraging drinking in moderation. As another example, if someone is moving from the city to
the countryside, then she is more likely to go for a walk.
• A cost argument is an argument that gives facts or an opinion concerning the cost of resolving the
healthcare problem. For example, the cost of membership for a local gym could be given in terms of
the monthly fee (60 British Pounds per month) or it could be given as less than the price of a coffee
each day. As another example, an unemployed person might believe that she cannot participate in
exercise activities at her local sports centre because she lacks money, and so she might be unaware
that often sports centres offer reduced cost or free activities for unemployed people.
• A commitment argument is an argument that captures a commitment made by the agent on
something related to the healthcare problem. For example, an agent may have committed to
participate in a marathon next year. In this example, the healthcare problem may that the agent
is unfit, the agent has made this commitment, and the agent needs to be persuaded to train for
the marathon.
• A motivation argument is an argument that gives an opinion on the motivation of the agent for
resolving the healthcare problem. For example, a user might forward an argument that she wants
to get fit for her summer holiday, but she is reluctant to do anything in her free time other than
watch television.
• A capacity argument is an argument that gives an opinion on the capacity of the agent for
addressing the healthcare problem. For example, if someone believes that she has a determined
and tenacious character, then she should be able to complete an exercise course. As another
example, in trying to persuade someone to increase the amount of exercise that she undertakes, an
argument against her signing up for an exercise class is that she has signed up a number of times
before and dropped out within a couple of weeks.
• An obstacle argument is an argument that gives an opinion on the obstacles that the agent might
face in addressing the healthcare problem. For example, for someone who lives far from the nearest
gym, the need to access the gym by driving a car might be an obstacle if she does not know how
to drive.
• A background argument is an argument that gives additional points about the background to
the problem or solution. For example, NHS staff want the best for their patients, or people who
do sports come in all shapes and sizes. A background argument is the category for any relevant
argument does not fall into any of the other categories.
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Type Concerns Correspondence to behaviour change modelling
Cause P Belief concerning causes of the problem
Attitude P/S N/A
Risk P Belief concerning risks from the problem
Benefit P Belief concerning benefits from resolving the problem
Opportunity S Belief concerning opportunities for resolving the problem
Cost S Belief concerning costs of resolving the problem
Commitment P/S Belief concerning commitments of agent
Motivation P Belief concerning agent’s motivation for addressing the problem
Capacity S Belief concerning agent’s capacity for addressing the problem
Obstacle S Belief concerning obstacles for resolving the problem
Background P/S N/A
Side-effect S N/A
Community P/S Beliefs concerning the agent’s community
Myth P/S N/A
Table 2: Summary of ontology. For each type, we give whether it concerns the problem (denoted P) or
the solution (S), and how it related to the behavioural change models we discussed in Section 2.
• A side-effect argument is an argument that gives facts or opinion on whether or not the solution
has side-effects. For example, flu vaccines can cause an anaphylactic reaction, or pregnant women
safely be given inactivated flu vaccine.
• A community argument is an argument that gives facts or an opinion on the cost to the community
of the problem and/or of the benefit to the community of resolving the healthcare problem. For
example, the family of an agent might think that she drinks too much, and this has a negative
impact on her health and behaviour, and that they would be happy if she reduced her consumption
to a more healthy level.
• A myth argument is an is an argument argument that is based on information that is commonly
held to be true but that is competely false with respect to the (scientific, legal, administrative, etc.)
facts. For example, lung cancer is a male, working class disease. We regard erroneous arguments as
requiring a special category which we call myth. When modelling a domain, we want to clearly flag
these arguments so that it is clear there is no doubt about them. Furthermore, when an erroneous
argument is used in a dialogue, the system needs a strategy that is careful to strongly argue against
it. In the field of health communications, such erroneous arguments would be described as contested
health information that involves controversy, and mistrust. Frequently, it is based on some form
of alleged conspiracy and spreads inaccurate, incorrect, inappropriate information [SMW+15].
We provide a summary of the ontology in Table 2 where we give the correspondence with behaviour
change modelling as discussed in Section 2.
4.2 Functional types
A functional type for an argument delineates the function that the argument can have in a dialogue.
Arguments presented in a dialogue are taken from the domain model. Domain model contains arguments
of the following functional types, and these constitute the basic disjoint categories of argument for the
purposes of computational persuasion in behaviour change.
Prospective This is an argument that is a goal and therefore reflects how a persuader or persuadee
would like the world to be. For example, the persuadee might have a goal that she would like to
lose weight, or the persuader might have the goal to have more people taking the flu vaccine.
Objective This is an argument that is based on information that we can regard (from the point of
view of the developers of the behaviour change application) as incontrovertible in the context
of the behaviour change application. It could be based on well-established scientific or medical
knowledge, or on current regulations and healthcare guidelines. For example, pregnant women can
safely be given inactivated flu vaccine.
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Persuasion goal User goal Societal goal
Functional
Objective
Subjective
Factual Evidence Example
Preference Opinion Counter-bias
Figure 5: Graphical representation of subtypes of the functional type.
Subjective This is an argument that is based on information that we can regard (from the point of
view of the developers of the behaviour change application) as controvertible in the context of the
behaviour change application. It could be based on less established scientific or medical knowledge,
on opinions, and attitudes. For example, flu is not a serious illness. This category also includes an
argument that is based on information that we can regard (from the point of view of the developers
of the behaviour change application) as completely incorrect in the context of the behaviour change
application. For example, needless use of vaccines increases vaccine-resistant pathogens. We refer
to such an erroneous argument as a myth.
The above categories are consistent with healthcare guidelines for managing people who have (po-
tential) healthcare issues that would benefit from a change of behaviour. Consider, for example, the
UK NICE Guideline on Weight Management: lifestyle services for overweight and obese [NIC14]. In
recommendation 7, the guideline advises “Discuss realistic weight-loss goals” (which involves arguments
concerning goals) and “Discuss the importance and wider benefits of adults who are overweight or obese
making gradual, long-term changes to their dietary habits and physical activity levels” (which involves
arguments arguments concerning objective and subjective information).
4.2.1 Prospective arguments
A goal is something that one of the agents (i.e., the persuadeer or persuadee) wants to be true, and the
goal concerns the persuadee. It may specify a desired goal state or action(s). For instance, a persuader
may have a goal specified as one or more of the following: (1) A desired goal state (e.g., lose 10Kg); (2)
A desired action (e.g., book an appointment with a counselor); and (3) A desired sequence of actions
(e.g., go to the gym every Tuesday and Thursday).
• A persuasion goal argument describes a goal that the system wants to persuade the user to
accept (e.g., do 2km walk every day). It may be to do something (e.g., to join an exercise class)
or to not do something (e.g., to stop smoking). The system wants the user to believe a persuasion
goal, and to be convinced by it.
• A user goal argument describes a specific goal that the user may have. Special cases are short-
term goal (e.g., be fit for village fun run), long-term goal or desire (e.g., to live a long healthy life),
etc.
• A societal goal argument describes a general goal that would normally be incontrovertible for
any normal user (e.g., not waste government money).
A set of goal arguments is not necessarily consistent for a particular persuadee. For example, a
persuasion goal might be “I need to eat more healthly, therefore I should eat less chocolate”, and a user
goal might be “I need to relax more, therefore I should eat more chocolate”. For a persuadee who needs
to eat more healthy and needs to relax more, there is a contradiction concerning whether or not to eat
more chocolate.
Goal arguments can be ranked by desirability. By ranking goals, we can aim to get the highest ranked
believed. If we fail, then we aim to get next highest believed, etc.
• Persuasion goal can by ranked by utility to the system (e.g., 2km walk per day is better than 10km
walk per day from the user’s point of view)
• User goal can by ranked by utility to the user (e.g., 30min exercise class is better than 90min
exercise class)
• Societal goal can by ranked by utility to society (e.g., taking public transport is better than taking
the car)
Ranking of goals is valuable extra information for the persuader in a dialogue. For instance, in a
dialogue where the persuasion goal A = “You could walk 10km daily to improve your health” is presented
by the system, and the user expresses strong agreement with the counterargument B = “I have never
walked 10km ever. It would be impossible.” It is unlikely that the system would have a counterargument
B that would cause her to believe A. The system could give up on A, and present a weaker persuasion
goal such as C = “You could walk 2km daily to improve your health".
To support the ranking of persuasion goals, we assume that the there is a ranking relation over
persuasion goals, and that this is defined from the point of view of the persuader. For example, suppose
we have the arguments A1 = “You could walk 10KM daily to improve your health”, A2 = “You could
walk 5KM daily to improve your health”, A3 = “You could walk 2KM daily to improve your health”,
and A4 = “You could walk 1KM daily to improve your health”. Then we could assume a ranking where
A1 is ranked 1, A2 is ranked 2, A3 is ranked 3, and A4 is ranked 4.
4.2.2 Objective arguments
An objective argument is based on objective information which is information that is incontrovertible or
information with substantial information to support its veracity such scientific knowledge, and statistical
data. Special cases are definition, regulation, established scientific knowledge, utilitarian, user fact, etc.
• A factual argument is an item of information that is normally incontrovertible such as definitions
(e.g., alcopops are a kind of alcoholic drink), regulations (e.g., it is illegal to text while driving),
established scientific knowledge (e.g., around half of all life-long smokers will die early), and user
facts (e.g., the persuadee is middle-aged).
• An evidence argument is a source of information to support a factual such as a link to a web
page. It provides more detailed information to reinforce a factual argument. It is possible that
there may be a chain of evidence arguments where each provides increasingly detailed information
in support of the argument at the start of the chain.
• An example argument is an instance of fact that supports the fact by being an illustration. Some-
times an example can communicate a lot of information. For instance, if someone has difficulty
seeing how she could take up a sport, examples could be given of individuals similar to the per-
suadee, and these examples would show that it is indeed in possible. Furthermore, examples can
be easier to understand than more general or abstract information.
Objective arguments are predominantly deployed by the system. They are the vehicle by which key
items of information are presented to the user in order to persuade her of the value of agreeing to the
persuasion goal, and of demonstrating the veracity of any argument supporting the persuasion goal.
4.2.3 Subjective arguments
A subjective argument is based on subjective information. It is a kind of argument that the system
can choose to query the user about to ask for the users degree of belief or agreement with the argument.
Special cases are opinion, and preference.
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• An opinion argument is a view on knowledge that may be controversial or that at least the
persuadee may doubt. Any of the categories presented in the ontology in Figure 4 may be the
subject of an opinion. For example, a user may have the opinion that she has high motivation
for exercise because she has signed up for numerous exercise classes, and the system may have an
opinion that the user has a low motivation for doing exercise because every time she signs up for
a new exercise class, she drops out after a week or two.
• A preference argument describes one or more preferences that the user has (e.g., I prefer take-away
food to cooking at home).
• A counter-bias argument is an argument that highlights and counters a cognitive bias in the
agent concerning the evaluation of themselves or of the healthcare problem. For example, an agent
may be unrealistically optimistic about her illness susceptibility, and if so, this could be explained
to the agent. See [Wei87] for more discussion of optimism about illness susceptibility, and how this
can be addressed through explanation.
Subjective arguments are predominantly arguments that reflect the persuadee’s position. The system
may ask the user about her belief or agreement in specific subjective, or the system may guess which
ones the user believes or agrees with. Using this information, the system can then attempt to select
appropriate counterarguments.
4.3 Context type
Some arguments only apply to some intended persuadees (i.e., some arguments are only applicable in
some contexts), and we call these contextual arguments. For example, some arguments might only
be applicable to people who live in London, or to people under the age of 18. Contextual arguments
would often be acquired from websites of local service providers (e.g., sports and leisure centres, local
transport operators, social services, community centres, local health organizations, etc.).
In order to ensure that only applicable arguments are presented to persuadees, we can tag them
according to context. Some key dimensions for context types for contextual arguments are the following.
• Age context This specifies the age range of a user in which an argument is applicable. For
example, “you can get to the country for a long walk using the bus service for free” is an argument
that might only apply to people greater than 64 years of age.
• Geographical context This specifies the geographical area of a user for which an argument is
applicable. For example, “you should take your medicine as prescriptions are free” is an argument
that applies to a user in Scotland but not in England.
• Status context This specifies the status the persuadee has to have for an argument to be appli-
cable. For example, “there is a free yoga class for unemployed people at your local gym”"” is only
applicable to unemployed people.
Context types would need to be tagged by annotators who have the background knowledge concerning
the applicable of the arguments. Once tagged by context type, an argument can only be used in a dialogue
if the model of the persuadee satisfies the context tag. For example, for the argument “you should take
your medicine as prescriptions are free”, if the user model contains the information that the persuadee
lives in Scotland, then the argument can be used in the dialogue, whereas if the user model contains the
information that the persuadee lives in England, then the argument cannot be used in the dialogue.
In order to automate the use of the context type, logic programming or a description logic ontology
could be used. For example, a tagging of an argument for the geographical context being restricted
to England could be captured by a literal of the form geo(England), and in the user model, the fact
that the user lives in London captured by a literal of the form geo(London). Then, a rule stating that
geo(London) implies geo(England) (i.e., geo(London)⇒ geo(England)) could be used to infer that the
geographical contraint of the argument is satisfied by the user.
The use of context types is consistent with healthcare guidelines for managing (potential) healthcare
problems. Consider, for example, the UK NICE Guideline on Weight Management: lifestyle services
for overweight and obese [NIC14]. In recommendation 8, the guideline advises to “discuss with adults
considering a lifestyle weight management programme what the programme does and does not involve,
...., other local services that may provide additional support (for example, local walking or gardening
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Keys(pg) = {sports activity, sign-up}
Keys(a1) = {self-conscious, body, sports}
Keys(a2) = {intimidated, sport}
Keys(a3) = {sports clubs, intimidating, unwelcoming}
Keys(b1a) = {body, sports}
Keys(b2a) = {clothes, sign-up}
Keys(b2b) = {sports}
Keys(c1a) = {sports, all shapes and sizes}
Keys(c2a) = {sports, care, sports fashion}
Keys(c3a) = {sports clubs, welcome new members, offer beginners classes}
Figure 6: Consider Figure 3. For each argument X , Keys(X) gives the keywords in X .
Topics(pg) = {SportParticipation}
Topics(a1) = {SportParticipation, SelfConsciousAboutBody}
Topics(a2) = {TooIntimidated4Sport}
Topics(a3) = {SportsClubsIntimidating, SportsClubsUnwelcoming}
Topics(b1a) = {SportParticipation,Body4Sport}
Topics(b2a) = {Clothes4Sport}
Topics(b2b) = {Knowledge4Sport}
Topics(c1a) = {DiverseBodyShapeInSport}
Topics(c2a) = {SportsFashionUnimportant}
Topics(c3a) = {SportsClubWelcomeNewMembers, SportsClubBeginnersClasses}
Figure 7: Consider Figure 3. For each argument X , Topics(X) gives the topics in X .
groups), any financial costs (including any costs once a funded referral has ended)”, and in addition, it
advises to “explore ... any concerns they may have, or barriers they may face, in relation to joining the
programme, the process of change or meeting their personal goals”. These recommendations therefore
call for consideration of the context of the user, and adaptation of the dialogue accordingly.
4.4 Topic types
Since some agents will be more interested in some topics than others, it is good to choose arguments
that are more interesting to the agent.
Topic types can be assigned using automated methods such as from information retrieval and text
classification. The simplest approach is to use keywords. Here the text of an argumentation is treated as
a “bag of words" (i.e., this is the set of words in the text minus so called “stop words"). Stop words are
simple and very common words such as articles, pronouns, conjunctions, and common verbs. Commonly
used lists of stop words contain around 200 to 300 words. Yet, around half of word occurrences used in
text are stop words. The remaining words are regarded as having some role in indicating the meaning
of the text when text is treated as a set of words. We illustrate keyword assignment in the example in
Figure 7.
Since many arguments are likely to have keywords in common, these keywords in common are not
good discriminators. Keywords that are less common in the graph can be good discriminators (e.g., in
the above example, “clothes" is a good discriminator that if expressed as an interest or concern by the
user, would allow the system focus on this part of the argument graph). Standard text classification
metrics can be used to automatically identify the best keywords to use for indexing arguments.
Another option is to use a fixed ontology for tagging the topics arising from each argument. The use
of ontologies is wide-spread for cataloging content. Existing ontologies could be adapted for providing
the range of topic indices that would be required for this role, or bespoke ontology could be developed
for the domain of the app. Identifying the topic of an argument, offers a better way than keywords in
helping to identify the arguments that may be of interest or important to a user. We illustrate the use
of topic tagging in the example in Figure 7.
As well as using standard techniques for using keywords, and topic classification, of arguments,
machine learning techniques could be used to train classifiers of content. While more challenging in
terms of getting reliable classification, it may offer the ability to get classification corresponding to a
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more sophisticated ontology. For more information on automated techniques for information retrieval
and text classification, see [MS00, BKL09].
4.5 Summary of types and their utility
We have proposed four main dimensions to the typing of arguments in the domain model. We summarize
these as follows.
• Ontological This type describes the kind of content of the argument based on the key factors used
in models of behaviour change as we discussed in Section 2.
• Functional This type describes the roles that an argument may take in a discussion. It is based
on the kind of content in an argument. For instance, the system can choose to start a dialogue with
a persuasion goal so that the user is clear from the start what the goal is, or the system can start
with a user goal, so that the user is clear form the start how the dialogue relates to her agenda.
• Context This type labels the argument with information delineating the applicability of the ar-
gument. If a user falls outside the area of applicability, the argument is irrelevant, and so should
not be used, as it does not apply to that user.
• Topic This type describes the topic of an argument. If the user expresses an interest in a topic,
then arguments labelled with these topics are more likely to be of interest to the user.
These types form the basis of a methodology for domain modelling. In order to construct a domain
model for an application, we can use the hierarchy of functional types (i.e., Figure 5) as the basis of
questions to investigate the domain, and thereby collate relevant arguments. For instance, we ask about
what are the possible persuasion goals, user goals, or societal goal relevant to this application. Similarly,
we can ask what are the self-perceptions, attitudes to social norms, attitudes to knowledge, etc. Once
the arguments have been collated, they can be arranged as an argument graph where each node is an
argument, and each arc denotes an attack or support relationship. In addition, all the types can be used
to add meta-level labels to each argument in order to describe the arguments.
Note, we do not assume any constraints, in general, on the arcs between the arguments of various
types. For instance, it is possible to have two arguments A and B where both are persuasion goals, and
A attacks B and B attacks A. Similarly, we can have user goals that attack each other, and we can have
a user goal attacking a persuasion goal and vice versa. For example, it is possible for an agent to have
the goal of being fit and to have the goal of doing no exercise. However, some kinds of attack would be
unusual for a behaviour change application. For instance, it would be unusual for an argument that is
a factual type to attack another argument that is also of a factual type. As another example, we would
expect that an erroneous argument or myth argument is attacked by a factual argument.
In the case studies, presented in Section 5, we provide four examples of labelling with ontological
types and discuss the the functional, context topic types for them. Then in Section 6, we discuss how
the user model could be designed to take advantage of the domain modelling.
5 Case studies
In order to test the dimensions for domain modelling, we undertake four case studies. Each case study
concerns an important topic in behaviour change. For each case study, we produced an argument graph
where each argument is labelled with a functional type. We briefly describe each case study below,
including some key sources we used for identifying relevant arguments, and we give the argument graphs
in Figures 8 to 11. Note, for each argument graph, we aim to give a non-exhaustive variety of arguments
that could be used in computational persuasion. Based on the resources we have available, it would be
straightforward to expand each graph with further arguments.
Women in sport We based this case study on a Sports England study into the engagement of young
women in sport which was commissioned to understand reasons for participating and for not par-
ticipating [CCR06]. Further arguments come from a Sports England initiative, This Girl Can,
for encouraging young women into sports participation1, and the biomedical literature [KHB05,
ADGF05]. The argument graph for this case study is given in Figure 8. The healthcare problem
being addressed is insufficient exercise and the solution is participate in sport.
1http://www.thisgirlcan.co.uk/feel-inspired/
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Office wellbeing initiative There is increasing interest from organizations in organizing resources and
initiatives to help their employees improve their wellbeing. One kind of activity is the formation
of groups in an office for specific regular exercise such as running or walking 10km each week.
Sources for arguments include a report from the Institute for Occupational Health on health and
wellbeing in the workplace [fOSH15], a report from the Scottish Executive Social Research [Mur06]
on participation in sport, information from the Workplace Wellbeing Charter website2 on workplace
exercise initiatives, and the biomedical literature [WDW+16] on workplace exercise initiatives. The
argument graph for this case study is given in Figure 9. The healthcare problem being addressed
is insufficient exercise and the solution is participate in office initiative.
Cervical screening Cervical screening, also known as the smear test, is a method to identify abnormal
cell growth on the cervix. Since these cells may lead to cervical cancer, and it can be advised that the
growth is removed in a surgical procedure. Despite the value of cervical screening in identifying
potential problems early, many women do not participant in cervical screening programmes for
various reasons. Sources for arguments include the biomedical literature [HBK91, EAS01, UAJ17]
and healthcare provider websites such as NHS Choices3 and the Mayo Clinic4. The argument graph
for this case study is given in Figure 10. The healthcare problem being addressed is risk of cervical
cancer and the solution is participate in screening programme.
Flu vaccine for healthcare workers In the UK, healthcare is provided by the National Health Service
(NHS) which is a government-funded organization. It is a very large employer. For instance, NHS
England has 1.3 million employees. With such a large number of works, there are many lost
days of work caused by influenza. Furthermore, NHS employees may be vulnerable to infection
from patients with influenza, and influenza passed onto patients causes complications. In order to
address these problems, the NHS offers free flu vaccination to NHS employees in the workplace.
Despite this, only around 50% of NHS employees take the vaccine. Arguments for and against
the flu vaccine were taken from the biomedical literature [MRMY15, SR13] and from websites
that discuss benefits such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention5 and websites that
discuss perceived problems with flu vaccinations such as the Mercola website6 and Natural Health
3657. The argument graph for this case study is given in Figure 11. The healthcare problem being
addressed is risk of influenza and the solution is participate in vaccination programme.
In developing the graphs in each case study, the ontological types were important in seeking the
relevant arguments. As can be seen, there is a diverse range of ontological types appearing in the case
studies.
Furthermore, each of the case studies has resulted in an argument graph with a mixture of functional
types. For reasons of space, we only include one or two persuasion goals in each case study. In the
three of the case studies, namely women in sport, office wellbeing initiative, and cervical screening, the
large majority of arguments are subjective, whereas in the fourth case study, namely flu vaccination,
there is an even balance of objective and subjective arguments. This is perhaps due to the availability
of scientific evidence surrounding the effects of flu vaccination programmes.
Having the subtypes of the functional type helps in identifying the arguments and counterarguments.
Each subtype can be treated as a question when searching for supporting or attacking arguments to any
given argument. For instance, given the persuasion goal, what are the opinions that support or attack
it, what are the objective arguments that support or attack it, what are the emotional arguments that
support or attack it, what are the self-perception arguments that support or attack it, etc. Then for
each argument that is put into the graph, this process can be repeated by recursion.
To illustrate the use of topic labelling, we can consider the argument graph for office wellbeing
initiative given in Figure 9. The key words are given in Figure 6 and the topic labellings are given in
Figure 7. If required, a finer-grained topic hierarchy could be used to have more distinction between the
arguments.
Finally, there are some context types for the case study arguments. In the women in sports case
study, some arguments only apply to women (e.g., “There are many women competing at the highest
level in many different sports”), and some arguments only apply in countries where there is a government
2http://www.wellbeingcharter.org.uk
3http://www.nhs.uk/pages/home.aspx
4http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/pap-smear/basics/why-its-done/prc-20013038
5https://www.cdc.gov/flu/index.htm
6http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2015/12/01/another-flu-vaccine-flop.aspx
7http://www.naturalhealth365.com/flu-shot-vaccine-dangers-1640.html
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[Persuasion goal]
I will sign up for
a sports activity.
[s1 Benefit]
Doing sport is
a great way to
relieve stress.
[s2 Benefit]
Doing sport
is a great way
to have fun.
[s3 Benefit]
Doing sport
is a great way
of improving
your social life.
[s4 Benefit]
Doing sport
brings health
benefits.
[r2a Obstacle]
I don’t find
sport is fun.
[r2a Context]
Sport at schools
was not fun.
[r3a Context]
I already
have plenty
of friends.
[r4a User goal]
Getting fit is
not impor-
tant to me.
[r4b Context] I
am already fit.
[q2a Opportu-
nity] There is a
wide variety of fun
sports activities
to be tried from
archery to zumba.
[q3a Opportu-
nity] There are
some great ways
you can do sports
with your friends.
[q4a Benefit] When
you get older, you
will appreciate having
got into the habit
of doing exercise.
[h1 Obstacle]
Sport is
for males.[i1a Context]
There are
many women
competing at
the highest
level in many
different sports.
[i1b Oppor-
tunity] Some
sports clubs
have activities
specifically
for women. [m1 Obstacle]
I don’t have
enough time
to do sport.
[j1a Oppor-
tunity] There
are sports
activities that
can be squeezed
into any time
of the day.
[a1 Capacity]
I feel too
self-conscious
about my body
to do sport.
[a2 Capacity]
I feel too
intimidated
to do sport.
[a3 Obstacle]
Sports clubs
seem intim-
idating and
unwelcoming.
[a4 Obstacle]
There is a lack
of opportunities
for doing sport.
[a5 Obstacle]
There are
hassles in order
to participate
in sport.
[b1a Obstacle] I
do not have the
body for sport.
[b2a Obstacle] I
do not have the
right clothes
to do sport.
[b2b Obstacle]
I do not know
what I am
supposed to
do when I try
to do sport.
[b5a Example]
Having to
fill in forms.
[b5b Example]
Having enough
money for fees.
[b5c Example]
Having to
prove age.
[c1a Back-
ground]
People who
do sport come
in all shapes
and sizes.
[c2a Back-
ground] Most
people who do
sport really do
not care about
sports fashion.
[c3a Opportunity]
Many sports clubs
are very keen to
welcome new comers,
and offer beginners
classes for them.
[c4a Opportunity]
With the new
government initiative,
there are many
opportunities to
participate in women’s
sport in your area.
[c5a Opportunity]
With the new
government initia-
tive, you can join
up for women’s
sport with the
minimum of hassle.
Figure 8: Argument graph for participation by women in sports. A dashed line denotes a support and a
solid line denotes an attack. The problem is insufficient exercise and the proposed solution is participate
in sport.
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[pg1 Persuasion goal]
I will join the office
group that walks
10km per week.
[pr1
Preference]
I prefer
walking to
running.
[pr2
Preference]
I prefer
running to
walking.
[pg2 Persuasion
goal] I will join the
office group that
runs 10km per week.
[s1 Benefit] Do-
ing it as an office
group will be fun.
[s2 Benefit] Signing
up for an office group
will make it harder
to not do it regularly.
[s3 Benefit] Doing
it as an office group
is a great way of
making friends.
[s4 Benefit] Doing
regular exercise will
be good for me.
[h1 Benefit] Walking
does not require
paying for any gear.
[h1 Obstacle] I
don’t have time
for exercise.
[i1a User goal]
I don’t want
to appear
anti-social
in the office.
[h2 Benefit] You
will feel proud
if you can beat
your colleagues
at running.
[h2 Back-
ground] I like
to feel proud.
[a0 Obstacle]
My colleagues
will laugh at me
if they see my
legs in shorts.
[a1 Obstacle] I feel too
self-conscious about
my body to do sport.
[a2 Obstacle] I
feel too intimi-
dated to do sport.
[a3 Cost] Getting
sweaty in front of
my colleagues is
too embarassing.
[a4 Risk] If I
don’t do regular
exercise, I will
have a raised
risk of health
problems.
[b0 Fact] Many
runners wear
pants rather
than shorts.
[b1a Obstacle] I
do not have the
body for running.
[b2a Obstacle] I do
not have the right
clothes to do running.
[b3 Background]
Everyone will be
the same and so it
really doesn’t matter.
[c1a Background]
People who do
running come in all
shapes and sizes.
[c2a Background]
Most runners really
do not care about
sports fashion.
[c3 User goal] I
want to stay healthy
for my children
/ grandchildren.
[c3 User goal] I would
like to make friends.
[m1 Motivation]
I think walking
is uninspiring.
Figure 9: Argument graph for office well-being initiative. A dashed line denotes a support and a solid
line denotes an attack. The problem is insufficient exercise and the proposed solution is participate in
office initiative.
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[Persuasion goal] I will
go for a smear test
soon as I haven’t been
for at least 3 years.
[s1 Obstacle] I
am embarrassed
to at exposing
private parts of my
body to a stranger.
[s2 Obstacle]
I fear medical
procedures.
[s3 Obstacle] I
fear the pain.
[s4 Obstacle]
I don’t like
hospital
or doctors
surgeries.
[r1 Opportunity] Healthcare profes-
sionals are experienced in examining
patients, and are able to put you
at ease about the examination.
[r2 Oppor-
tunity] It is
just a simple
non-painful
procedure.
[r4 Oppor-
tunity] It is
something
that is done
very quickly.
[h1 Risk] I’m
not sexually
active, and
so I don’t
need to do it.
[i1 Risk] If
you have ever
been sexually
active, then the
medical advice
is to participate
in screening.
[h2 Risk] I’ve
had a partial
hysterectomy,
and so I don’t
need to do it.
[h2 Risk]
Normally, the
medical advice
is to continue
with screening.
[m1 Obstacle]
I don’t have
enough time
to do the test.
[j1 Risk] Think
how you would feel
if you only found
out that you had it
when had advanced.
[j2 Benefits] You
will feel guilty if you
don’t do the test.
[a0 Community]
Many of my
friends do it.
[a1 Risk] I
am scared of
getting cancer.
[a2 Attitude]
Since my doctor
recommends
it, I will do it.
[a3 Benefit] The
benefit in terms
of piece of
mind outweighs
the hassle
of doing it.
[a4 Risk] The
absolute risk
of getting
cervical cancer
is very low.
[a5 Risk] The
test can have
false positives.
[a6 Obstacle]
I don’t know
if I could cope
with getting a
positive result.
[b4 Benefit] The
benefit of getting the
test done greatly out-
weighs the cost and
the low absolute risk.
[b5 Benefits] The proportion
of false positives are rela-
tively small, and normally
they can be quickly identi-
fied with some further tests.
Figure 10: Argument graph for participation in cervical smear screening. A dashed line denotes a support
and a solid line denotes an attack. The problem is risk of cervical cancer and the proposed solution is
participate in screening programme.
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[Risk] Flu is not
a serious illness.
[Risk] Flu can be
a serious disease
that can lead to
hospitalization
and even death.
[Risk] The vast
majority of people
do not have serious
problems with flu.
[Obstacle] NHS staff
are too busy to get
the flu vaccination.
[Risk] NHS staff are
too busy to not get
the flu vaccination.
[Community] It
is cost-effective
for the NHS to
vaccinate its staff.
[Persuasion goal]
NHS staff taking the
annual flu vaccine
will be beneficial.
[Myth] Needless
use of vaccines
increases vaccine-
resistent pathogens.
[Side-effect] Vaccines
do not kill pathogens,
and therefore their
use cannot increase
pathogen resistence.
[Side-effect] Flu
vaccines can cause an
anaphylactic reaction.
[Side-effect] The
incidence of an
anaphylactic reaction
is very low, and
many more people
suffer from severe
negative effects of flu.
[Myth] Flu vaccines
can cause a weakening
of the immuno-
system, and there
is increased illness
after vaccination.
[Side-effect] Flu
vaccines do not
weaken the immuno-
system, and illness
after vaccination
indicates the system
is already weak.
[Myth] Flu vaccines
contain mercury.
[Side-effect] Flu
vaccines do not
contain mercury, they
only contain the virus
in a saline suspension.
[Benefit] Flu vaccines
do not work because
the kind of virus
has to be guessed.
[Benefit] Normally
the flu vaccine is
chosen correctly and
works effectively.
[Benefit] Some-
times the vaccine is
chosen incorrectly
and so sometimes
it is ineffective.
[Benefit] Having
a protection that
normally works
is better than
no protection.
[Myth] Taking a
flu vaccine is not
necessary every year.
[Benefit] The flu
virus mutates and
so getting the latest
vaccine ensures
immunity against
the most likely cause
of an outbreak.
[Side-effect] Pregnant
women should not be
offered the flu vaccine
as it is dangerous.
[Side-effect] Preg-
nant women can
safely be given inac-
tivated flu vaccine.
[Background] NHS
staff don’t worry
about keeping
themselves healthy.
[Background] NHS
staff are not con-
cerned about
infecting patients.
[Background] NHS
staff want the best
for their patients.
[Background] NHS
staff are exposed to
many viral infections
from patients.
[Cause] NHS staff
can infect patients.
[Cause] Some patient
groups have high
risk of serious
complications
if that get flu.
[Cause] NHS staff
have a strong sense
of community.
[Risk] The majority
of NHS staff have
no face-to-face
contact with patients.
[Risk] The majority
of NHS staff are in
the same building,
breathing the same
air, sharing the
facilities, touching
the same services.
[Risk] There are
disinfectant dispensers
that can inhibit the
spread of infection.
[Risk] Most people do
not use the dispensers.
[Risk] Most staff
use the dis-
pensers regularly.
Figure 11: Argument graph for flu vaccine for healthcare workers. A dashed line denotes a support and
a solid line denotes an attack. The problem is risk of influenza in healthcare workers and the proposed
solution is participate in vaccination programme.
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initiative for women in sports (e.g., “With the government initiative, there are many opportunities to
participate in women’s sport in your area”). In the office wellbeing initiative, some arguments only apply
to people who work (e.g., “I would be too embarrassed to get sweaty in front of my colleagues”). In the
cervical screening case study, most arguments only apply to women. In the flu vaccine for healthcare
workers case study, the arguments that refer to staff only apply to NHS staff.
6 Using domain models
The domain model can be used by the system to make strategic choices of move. In order to illustrate
this, we consider the office well-being initiative in Figure 9. There are two persuasion goals here.
• (pg1) I will join the office group that walks 10km per week.
• (pg2) I will join the office group that runs 10km per week.
Recall that the system has a user model. This is a model that the system has of the user. It may
have gained information about the user by previous interactions with the user, or by asking the user
questions, or by knowledge of agents similar to the user. We are not concerned here with how that model
is obtained, we just make some assumptions about the information in it. In particular, for this example,
we assume that the user model is a probability value for each argument. It is an estimate that the system
has of the user’s belief in each argument. Now, suppose that user model has a high probability of belief
in the following argument.
• (pr2) I prefer running to walking.
Then according to the domain model, pg1 is attacked, and pg2 is supported. This suggests to the
system, that strategically it would be better to try to persuade the user of pg2 (i.e., to join the office
group that runs 10km per week).
Next, the system has some choices. Should it provide one or more opinions to support the persuasion
goal (i.e one or more of s1 to s4), or should it provide an emotional argument (i.e., h2), or should it
try to tackle the possible counterarguments that the user might have (i.e., a0 to a3), or should it try to
support the persuasion goal with highlighting a future risk from not changing behaviour (i.e., a4).
To address this choice, the system again refers to the user model, and identifies that the user has a
goal of making new friends (i.e., the user model has high belief in the argument c5). This supports s3,
and so supports pg2. The system reminds the user of c5, and presents s3, as support for pg2.
• (c5) I would like to make friends.
• (s3) Doing it [i.e., joining the group that runs 10km per week] as an office group is a great way of
making friends.
When referring to the user model, the system may also notice that the user has some belief in a
couple of counterarguments to the persuasion goal. These counterarguments are:
• (a0) My colleagues will laugh at me if they see my legs in shorts.
• (a3) I would be too embarrassed to get sweaty in front of my colleagues.
Suppose the confidence for these beliefs is not high. According to the user model, the user believes
these arguments, but the system is not confident that the user does indeed belief them. In other words,
the system thinks the user model might be inaccurate with regard to these arguments for this user. To
address this, the system can ask the user whether these arguments are reasons for the user to not accept
the persuasion goal. Now, suppose the user says that a3 is indeed a reason to not accept the persuasion
goal, the system can provide the following counterargument.
• (b3) Everyone will be the same and so it really doesn’t matter.
This example illustrates how the domain model, together with the user model, can be used so that
arguments are selected from the domain model as part of strategy to persuade the user.
As we have already mentioned, the tags can be further used to select certain kinds of argument in
preference to others. For example, if in the user model it is known that the user responds better to
supporting arguments than attacking arguments, or the user responds better to emotional arguments
than factual arguments, then that strategic knowledge can be harnessed by the system when it is choosing
which move to make.
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7 Discussion
Our primary concern in the paper is in domain modelling. For argument-based persuasion, we need
access to relevant arguments and counterarguments. For this, we have made the following contributions:
• We have discussed how the beliefs of an agent concerning a healthcare problem is of central im-
portance in judging whether a particular healthcare intervention is likely to be successful, and we
have identified a number of dimensions for these beliefs that are considered implicitly or explicitly
in the behaviour change literature (Section 2).
• We have provided a framework for domain modelling that provides a number of types and sub-
types. This framework forms the basis of questions that can be used to identify arguments and
counterarguments for a specific behaviour change application, and it provides tags that can used
by the computational persuasion system for optimizing the choice of argument or counterargument
in a dialogue.
• We evaluated the framework by constructing argument graphs for behaviour change applications
in participation of women in sport, in office wellbeing initiative, in participation in cervical smear
screening, and in flu vaccine for healthcare visitors. These case studies show how a wide range of
the types of argument can appear each argument graph.
There are many approaches to domain modelling in computer science. However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no approach to domain modelling that is appropriate for acquiring and tagging
different kinds of argument for use in behaviour change. Some of the types and subtypes do arise in agent-
based modelling. In particular, the belief-desires-intentions (BDI) framework does provide an approach
to modelling the differences between beliefs (i.e., what an agent believes about the world), desires (i.e.,
what an agent would like to achieve in the world), and intentions (i.e., what an agent has chosen to do in
the world) [RG91]. Desires can lead to goals, and intentions can lead to plans. However, this framework
is formalized in a modal logic that provides an axiomatization for representing and reasoning with these
concepts.
As we suggested in Section 3, the domain model is an important component of an automated per-
suasion system as it provides the all-important arguments for the dialogue. In addition, as we have
suggested in Section 6, the domain model is important for making strategic choices of argument. Whilst
the domain model is potentially valuable for diverse approaches to argumentation, we are particularly
interested in using these models with the epistemic approach to argumentation. This approach to prob-
abilistic argumentation offers a formal framework for clarifying the nature of belief in arguments. It is
based on a probability distribution over the subsets of arguments from which the belief in an argument
is derived [Thi12, Hun13, BGV14, HT16, PHT17]. An argument can therefore be to a certain degree
believed, disbelieved, or neither. We have also undertaken empirical studies with participants that lend
support to the value of probabilistic argumentation [PH17].
We have applied the probabilistic approach to modelling a persuadee’s beliefs in arguments. This
includes methods for updating beliefs during a dialogue [Hun15, Hun16b], for efficient representation
and reasoning with the probabilistic user model [HH16], for representing uncertainty in the user model
[Hun16c], for harnessing decision-theoretic decision rules for optimizing the choice of arguments based on
the user model [HH17], and for crowd-sourcing belief in arguments that can be used to train classifiers
to predict an agent’s belief in arguments [HP17]. These developments offer a framework with a well-
understood theoretical methodology, and implementations that are computationally viable for strategic
argumentation.
Alternative approaches to strategic argumentation include considering uncertainty with respect to
the structure of the graph (i.e., the arguments the user is aware of) rather than the belief in arguments
[RTO13], and with respect to previous moves the user has made [HSM+13].
There are also some other investigations of computational models of argument with participants that
lend support for probabilistic approach to argumentation, and for harnessing user models, in strategic
argumentation. Studies performed by Rahwan et al [RMB+10] and Cerruti et al [CTO14] investigated
various forms of reinstatement in argumentation. The users were presented several argument graphs
and were asked to explain how acceptable a given argument is in their opinion. The results show that
in some cases, the implicit knowledge about domains can substantially affect the given acceptability
levels. However, more importantly, the experiments show that the attacked argument’s acceptability is
lowered, but does not fall to 0, which is what would be predicted by the usual dialectical semantics for
abstract argumentation. Additionally, introducing the defense for this argument raises its acceptability.
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However, typically it does not reach the value of 1, which is the level the usual dialectical semantics would
predict. This study lends support for using the epistemic approach for a finer grained representation of
belief/disbelief.
In a study of argumentation dialogues, Rosenfeld and Kraus [RK15] undertook an experiment in
order to develop a machine learning-based approach to predict the next move a participant would make
in a dialogue. This work was further extended in [RK16a, RK16b]. The machine learning models were
trained on data that incorporated the sequences of arguments in a dialogue that the participants accept.
Once trained, the models were able to predict the acceptance an unseen case would have.
There are also studies with participants by Masthoff and co-workers that investigate the efficacy of
using arguments as a way of persuading people when compared with other counselling methods indicating
that argumentation may have disadvantages if used inappropriately [NM08], and that rather than a
confrontational approach, argumentation that is based on appeal to friends, appeal to group, or appeal
to fun, may be more efficacious [VSM+13, VSMO16].
We now turn to the two inter-related topics that we would like to investigate in future work. These
are the nature and role of emotion in argumentation, and the way that arguments are presented in
argumentation.
Emotional arguments play on the emotions of the persuadee. They attempt to invoke an emotional
response in the user in way that she would be persuaded by the argument. An emotional argument
is often an argument that involves accepting, or believing, or doing, something will cause a positive or
negative emotion in you or those around you.
• You will be elated if you complete the marathon.
• Taking the flu vaccine means that you do not need to worry about getting flu this year.
• Many of your colleagues are doing exercise classes, and so you will feel left out if you don’t partic-
ipate.
Emotional arguments are predominantly deployed by the system in order to influence the user via
emotional devices to be persuaded to agree to the persuasion goal. In certain situations, they can be
powerful arguments in persuasion. For instance, Lukin et al [LAWW17] have shown that with some
audiences, emotional arguments are more effective in persuasion than factual arguments. For this,
they categorized audiences according to the OCEAN personality traits (i.e., openness to experience,
extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism — see [Gol93] for a review of personality
traits).
Emotion in argumentation has also been the subject of a study with participants in a debate where
the emotional state was estimated from EEG data and automated facial expression analysis. In this
study, Benlamine et al [BCV+15] showed for instance that the number and the strength of arguments,
attacks and supports exchanged between a participant could be correlated with particular emotions of
the participant.
However, the modelling emotional aspects of argument has received little attention in the computa-
tional argumentation literature. There is a proposal for rules for specifying scenarios where empathy is
given or received in negotiation [MM09], and there is a proposal for specifying argument schema (rules
that specify general patterns of reasoning) for capturing aspects of emotional argument [LW12]. It would
be interesting to investigate if how these ideas could be adapted to the context of persuasion dialogues,
and in particular how this might impinge upon the tagging of the emotional dimensions as suggested in
this paper.
There are various ontologies for emotion types. For instance, the emotion annotation and representa-
tion language (EARL) proposed by the Human-Machine Interaction Network on Emotion (HUMAINE)
classifies 48 emotions [SPL06, SDK+07]. In general, the structure of such ontologies is debatable.
Nonetheless, they may be useful in labelling arguments with respect to the kind of emotion is being
caused by the statement of the argument. To illustrate this, we consider the following arguments taken
from our case study:
• You will feel guilty if you do not do the [smear] test.
• Think how you would feel if you only found out the you had it [i.e., cervical cancer] once it had
advanced.
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In the first argument, the decision to not do the smear test is explicitly claimed to cause a feeling
of guilt (a negative thought according to the EARL ontology), whereas in the second argument, the
invoking of an emotional response is implicit. In the second argument, the words “think how you would
feel” together with the negative outcome is meant to invoke a negative feeling in the reader.
Whilst it may be possible to automatically identify emotional arguments using sentiment analysis
technology, the variety and subtlety of emotion arguments means that in the short-term annotators
would be required to identify emotional arguments. It would appear feasible to identify a range of
general patterns of emotional arguments that could be incorporated in guidelines for annotation. It is
interesting to note that affective computing has put emotion at the centre of the relationship between
users and computing systems [CD10]. It therefore seems that affective computing offers a number of
ways to build on the suggestion for tagging of emotional arguments as suggested here.
The way that arguments are presented to users can affect the success with which they can persuade
the user. This may depend on the emotional response invoked, and this may in turn be related to
the personality of the user. Personality is clearly an important aspect of persuasion [Nah17]. Some
arguments only work with certain kinds of people — for instance, for an argument to persuade someone
to vote in the national election we could have the following arguments:
• If the person “follows the crowd”, then use an argument telling her that the majority of the
population voted in the last election.
• If the person “follows rules rigorously”, then use an argument telling her that it is her duty to vote.
Above suggests that arguments could be classified/tagged by the types of personality that might
respond positively to them. For example, arguments could be tagged according to what kind of appeal
they have (e.g., to authority, to conform to rules, to follow the crowd, to win approval, etc.). Then,
when the system is choosing which arguments to use, it could select arguments that are more likely
to be efficacious with the personality of that particular user. To classify the user, standard methods
for personalty traits could be used (e.g., OCEAN [Gol93]) or multi-dimensional private traits could be
predicted from digital records of the user (e.g., from Facebook likes) [KSG13]. Then different dimensions
for typing arguments according to presentation style include the following.
• The grammatical style concerns the grammatical phrasing of the premises and claim of the
argument. This includes whether the verb is imperative v. conditional, whether first v. third
person is used, etc.
– You should take more exercise.
– You are advised to take more exercise.
– It would be good if you took more exercise.
– If I were you, I would take more exercise.
– Everyone is recommended to consider taking more exercise.
Different kinds of user may respond differently to different phraseology. For instance, an imperative
style may work with some kinds of user, and be counter-productive with others.
• The linguistic style concerns the broader linguistic style of the premises and claim of the argu-
ment. For instance, whether an informal or formal style is used. For this, the choice of words,
including colloquial words, the complexity of sentences, etc., can be important. As an example,
emotion invoked through choice of words can be important in persuasion. This is a well-studied
area in psychology through the development of effective norm databases [BL99, WKB13]. These
capture the emotion response to specific words in three dimensions: arousal (ranging from excited
to calm), valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant), and dominance (ranging from being in
control to being dominated). To illustrate, for valence scores, leukemia and murder are low and
sunshine and lovable are high; for arousal scores, grain and dull are low and lover and terrorism
are high; and for dominance scores, dementia and earthquake are low, and smile and completion
are high.
• The framing style of an argument concerns the exact phrasing of an argument which can influence
how it is perceived. It is increasingly acknowledged in healthcare professions that interactions with
patients should use effective communication that is respectful and non-judgmental (see, for example,
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[NIC14]). Such a stance would be a natural point for automated persuasion systems. However, this
still leaves much latitude in how arguments can be framed. Consider, for example, experiments by
Tversky and Kahneman where people face one of the two situations [TK81]:
– Situation 1: Vaccine A can only save 200 lives for sure, whereas vaccine B has a 1/3 probability
of saving 600 lives and a 2/3 probability of saving none.
– Situation 2: Vaccine C causes 400 people to die for sure, whereas with vaccine D there is a
1/3 probability that nobody dies, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people die.
Obviously, the argument is the same in both situations if we consider a population of 600. However,
in situation 1, people massively prefer vaccine A while in situation 2 they prefer vaccine D. The
explanation is that in the context of gain (situation 1) people tend to be averse to risk and in the
context of loss (situation 2) they try to minimize the loss.
In a user study on the persuasiveness of healthy eating messages [TMO17], positively framed mes-
sages (e.g., Most people believe that eating a healthy breakfast contributes to a longer lifespan) were
considered better than negatively framed messages (e.g., Most people believe that eating an unhealthy
breakfast contributes to a shorter lifespan). Furthermore, Cialdini’s principles of persuasion [Cia84] were
considered (i.e., reciprocation, commitment, consensus, liking, authority, and scarcity), and it was found
that arguments that appeal to authority (e.g., Studies conducted by health experts have shown that
eating a healthy breakfast keeps you energized) are the most persuasive.
The need to recognize the primary audience of healthcare messages is well understood in healthcare
communications in general [OYMM03], that the messages are chosen to be easy to process [SMW+15],
and ideally that are individualized messages [DBC+06]. The above suggestions for future work go
beyond this by developing techniques for argumentation that type the arguments according to the types
of emotion likely to be invoked by the argument, and the types of user according to the personality for
whom the argument will be effective. Since, the arguments are presented in natural language, this then
raises the need to better understand how different presentational styles could be incorporated in the
domain modelling.
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